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In this paper we investigate to what extent firm investment in transition countries is sensitive 
to internal finance.  We use accounts data of over 4000 companies in four countries at 
different stages of transition. We find that firms in Bulgaria and Romania are less sensitive to 
internal financing constraints, in contrast to firms in Poland and the Czech Republic.  A likely 
explanation is that Bulgaria and Romania, which are the least advanced in the reforms 
towards market economy, have a stronger persistence of soft budget constraints than in the 
other two more advanced countries.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market orientated economy that started in 
Central and Eastern Europe more than a decade ago implied the need for substantial 
restructuring of many inefficient firms.  Theoretical models made a distinction between initial 
and strategic restructuring (e.g. Grosfeld and Roland, 1997; Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess, 
1994; Blanchard, 1997).  While the former is concerned with getting rid of labor hoarding, 
the latter is concerned with achieving long run viability of firms.  
One of the key components of strategic restructuring in these models refers to the 
investment decision that firms need to make.  At the start of transition it became clear that 
most firms had to invest heavily to modernize their obsolete capital stock and thus to improve 
their long run viability if they were to compete in international markets.  However, the 
external conditions such as the functioning of capital markets and the presence or absence of 
soft budget constraints are of crucial importance to achieve such strategic restructuring.  In 
particular, if soft budget constraints (SBC) persist (i.e., the government or other institutions 
bail out loss making firms), restructuring may be postponed (Kornai, 1999; Dewatripont, 
Maskin and Roland, 2000).  In their 1999 transition report, the EBRD has indeed documented 
the continuation of soft budget constraints in most of the transition economies, not through 
direct subsidies, but rather via indirect ways, such as tax arrears or “preferential” bank loans. 
In this paper we use a unique panel of more than 4,000 manufacturing firms 
consisting of comparable data for Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania 
between 1994-1999.  The main purpose is to contrast the investment behavior of firms in the 
slowly reforming economies of Bulgaria and Romania versus those in fast reforming 
countries, Poland and the Czech Republic.  We find firms in Poland and the Czech Republic 
to be credit constrained, suggesting that capital markets are not functioning properly.  In   3
contrast firms in Bulgaria and Romania seem far less dependent on internal financing to 
invest.  We interpret this result as evidence of stronger persistence of SBC in this group of 
slowly reforming transition countries.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  
Section II introduces the methodology and discusses estimation issues.  Section III describes 
the data set and discusses the estimation results.  The final section IV concludes.  
 
II. Background, Empirical Model and Estimation Issues 
 
The standard accelerator model of investment, assuming perfect capital markets, 
relates investment to the output performance in firms.
1  Financial variables should have no 
impact on the investment decision of firms as internal and external finance are perfect 
substitutes in perfect capital markets. However, in the context of transition economies where 
capital markets are just emerging and in the face of substantial information asymmetries, the 
assumption of perfect capital markets is harder to defend. 
There are only a handful of papers that study the investment behavior of firms in 
transition countries. Lizal and Svejnar (2001) and Anderson and Kegels (1997) analyze 
investment in firms in the Czech Republic in the 1990s, while Budina, Garretsen and de Jong 
(2000) analyze investment of Bulgarian firms over the period 1993-1995.  
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where  I stands for gross investment defined as the change in the real capital stock plus 
depreciation, Q is the growth of real sales of the firm, CF is the real cash flow of the firm, K 
is the level of the real capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets), subscript i refers to 
firm i and subscript t refers to year. We normalize by the capital stock to control for size 
effects. We deflated all nominal values with the producer price index.  The parameter αi 
represents an unobservable firm level fixed effect that may be correlated with the other 
explanatory variables and εit is a white noise error term.  
As in other studies, the growth in real sales in equation (1) proxies for the investment 
opportunities. The coefficient α2 captures the sensitivity of firm level investment with respect 
to the internal financing of the firm and is the coefficient of interest.  A low value of the cash 
flow coefficient, α2 , suggests that the firm has access to external finance while a high value 
of α2 suggests that investment is largely dependent on the profitability and the liquidity of the 
firm as measured by the cash flow.
2   
To control for the unobserved firm level fixed effect we will estimate equation (1) in 
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By estimating equation (2) we can obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest 
and at the same time control for potential firm heterogeneity.  Furthermore, we will treat the 
regressors as endogenous as it is conceivable that higher investment leads to higher changes 
in sales and higher cash flows. There may be measurement error in the variables as well. We 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Some of the most successful empirical investment models are based on the traditional acceleration principle, 
which links the demand for capital goods to the level or change in firm’s output or sales. (e.g., Abel and 
Blanchard, 1986 and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988).   5
will estimate equation (2) including year dummies to control for unobserved common 
aggregate shocks. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that in a first difference model as in equation 
(2) good instruments are the values of the endogenous explanatory variables dated t-2 and at 
earlier dates as they are not correlated with the contemporaneous first differenced error term.  
As the panel progresses an increasing number of instruments can be used which increases the 
efficiency of the estimates.  We will therefore compute a Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions to test the validity of the instruments used.  Furthermore, we will also report a 
second order serial correlation test (SOC) which is asymptotically N (0,1) distributed.  The 
absence of second order serial correlation is consistent with the absence of first order serial 
correlation in the levels equation (1). This is important to verify as we are using lagged 
values of the endogenous explanatory variables as instruments. 
 
III.  Data and Results 
 
We use data from company accounts recorded in the AMADEUS database.
3  To be 
included in AMADEUS companies must comply with at least one of the following criteria: 
(i) turnover greater than 10 million EUR; (ii) number of employees greater than 150; (iii) 
total assets greater than 10 million EUR.  Uniformity is achieved by standardization of 
accounting information enabling easy cross border analysis. We examine the time period 
1994-1999, a period for which AMADEUS has a large coverage of firms.  We trace firms for 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Experimenting with other proxies for the liquidity variable, such as the liquidity ratio yielded qualitatively the 
same results.   
3 AMADEUS is a Pan-European financial database, created and distributed by the Bureau Van Dijk on CD-
ROM, containing information on medium and large public and private companies.  The data are collected by 
local information providers and Bureau Van Dijk makes them consistent to faciliate cross-country comparisons. 
For Bulgaria are provided by Creditreform Bulgaria OOD; for Czech Republic-by Albertina Data; for Poland-by 
InfoCredit; and for Romania-by Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce.    6
at least three consecutive years and table 1 gives an overview of the structure of the panel and 
the number of firms in each country.  
Summary statistics of the relevant variables such as employment, investment, growth 
of sales and cash flow are reported in table 2.  We can already note that firms in Bulgaria and 
Romania, the two slow reformers, have on average lower investment rates and lower growth 
rates in real sales.  
The regression results are reported in table 3.  The results are IV GMM estimates 
where we treat the growth in real sales and the cash flow as endogenous. In the first column 
we report the unconstrained model, while in the second column we report the liquidity 
constrained model.  The estimated coefficient α1, of the change in real sales controlling for 
investment opportunities, is positive in all countries and similar in magnitude to what has 
been reported in previous studies for transition economies.  This suggests that the accelerator 
model is not a bad approximation for describing investment behavior in transition economies. 
We next turn to the discussion of liquidity constraints in column (2).  The coefficients 
on the cash flow take different values for the different countries in our sample.  While for 
Poland and the Czech Republic, α2 is highly significant and positive this is not the case for 
Bulgaria and Romania.  For Bulgarian firms we find a relatively low coefficient of 0.025 that 
is statistically significant only at the 10% critical level.  This compares to a coefficient of 
0.07 for both Polish and Czech firms.  For Romanian firms there is no statistically significant 
effect of cash flows on investment.  Thus firms in Poland and the Czech Republic seem to be 
credit constrained, a result often observed in western market economies as well.  To put it 
differently, firm investment in these countries seems to depend on the liquidity of firms.  
Furthermore, credit constraints seem far less present in the least advanced transition 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania. It is unlikely that this is a reflection of perfect capital 
markets, given the many uncertainties and the early stage of financial reforms characterizing   7
these two countries.  The alternative explanation is that soft budget constraints prevail in 
Bulgaria and Romania, which implies that firms are not operating under liquidity constraints.  
When access to credit is facilitated through preferential lending under a variety of patterns, 
investment becomes less sensitive to internal firm financing. 
Finally, as a robustness check of the sensitivity of our results to outliers, we have re-
estimated every country regression for a sample excluding firm-years with negative 
investment to capital ratios, which can be considered as outliers in the dataset.  The results 
are presented in table 4 and show to be qualitatively the same as the results for the full 




  This paper uses comparable firm level data for four transition economies, two fast 
reformers and two slow reformers, to analyze the impact of internal financial constraints on 
firm’s investment behavior.  For the fast reformers we find, as in well-developed market 
economies, that firms are liquidity constrained in their investment decisions.  However, in the 
slowly reforming economies, we find that such constraints are less important.  This is 
unlikely to be a reflection of the presence of perfect capital markets, rather it is likely to be a 
reflection of the presence of soft budget constraints in these countries. 
  A further exploration of how soft budget constraints influence firm’s restructuring and 
performance is not only important in transition economies, but also in well-developed market 
economies, where soft budget constraints may exist.    8
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Table 1 Structure of the panel 
Number of firms  Years of 
observation  Poland Czech  Republic  Bulgaria  Romania 
3  251 221 268 196 
4  148 379 293 551 
5  55 444 621 983 













Table 2 Summary statistics 
Poland Czech  Republic  Bulgaria  Romania   
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
E  514 978 504  1034 386 761 743  1391 
I/K  0.049 0.186 0.132 0.290 0.017 0.475  -0.108 0.467 
Q/K  0.327 1.847 0.437 3.210  -0.176 1.984 0.113 9.913 
CF/K  0.307 0.767 0.170 0.628 0.198 3.654 0.357 3.566 
Note: E: number of employees; I: gross fixed investment, including depreciation, over beginning of period 




Table 3: Dependent variable: I/K 
GMM IV estimates 
Poland Czech  Republic Bulgaria  Romania   
I  II I II I II I II 


























454 454 1044 1044 1182 1182  1730  1730
Number of 
observations 
1620 1620 4399 4399 5081 5081 7710 7710
SarganTest    0.413 0.822 0.980 0.593 0.210 0.308 0.204 0.132
SOC  1.476 1.487 1.053 0.991 1.277 1.267 1.741 1.634
Note:  two step robust t-statistics in brackets, Q/K and CF/K are instrumented using all available moment 
restrictions from t-2 and before. All equations include year dummies. The Sargan test is χ2 distributed, p-values 
are reported, p-values below 0.05 would suggest a rejection of the validity of the instruments at the 5% critical 
level. The second order serial correlation test (SOC) follows a Normal distribution, a value above 2 or below –2 




Table 4: Dependent variable: I/K 
GMM IV estimates (only firms with positive investment rates) 
 
Poland Czech  Republic Bulgaria  Romania   
I II I II I II I II 


























422 422 901 901 1081 1081 1474  1474
Number of 
observations 
856 856  2655 2655 2248 2248 3433  3433
Sargan Test  0.467  0.247  0.401 0.433 0.467 0.179 0.232  0.263
SOC 1.043  1.324  1.174 1.340 1.119 1.124 1.475  1.469
Note:  as in table 3 
 
 